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RATIONAL RESPONSES AND THE STABILITY OF 
THE RICE MARKET 
 
 
SHINICHI SHIGTEOMI 
 
 
In this concluding chapter, we will summarize the three case studies and discuss their 
implications for policies aimed at enhancing the security of supply in the world rice market. 
In the preceding three chapters, we showed that the policy response of each government to the 
crisis was understandable—in some cases, inevitable—in light of each country’s internal 
economic and political needs, even though some of the policy choices brought about 
undesirable results. In a sense, the choices made by the governments were “rational.” This 
implies that similar responses may be repeated in future crises. A preventive scheme, 
therefore, should be built which takes into account such rational responses by rice-exporting 
countries. 
 
 
1. Rational Responses to Internal Needs: A Summary 
 
India: A Mixed Policy Approach for both Farmers and Consumers 
India has a large number of farmers and consumers living in poverty. A rice price rise 
threatens the food security of consumers, while a price fall impoverishes farmers. In order to 
secure cheap rice for poor consumers without impoverishing farmers, the Indian government 
has set up a system which intervenes into both the paddy procurement market and the retail 
market for milled rice. This system has stimulated rice production to grow more rapidly than 
domestic consumption, creating a surplus for export since the mid-1990s. Having access to 
export markets, the government can discharge the surplus, but at the same time, it faces the 
impact of international market conditions on the domestic market. When the government saw 
signs of a price surge in the export market at the end of 2007, it had to control the linkage 
between the international and the domestic markets. Since the government’s intent was to 
protect poor consumers from the effects of the price surge, the government set a minimum 
export price (MEP) to restrain the export of low-grade rice.  
However, the impact of the international price rise was too strong for the Indian 
government to deflect its influence by this method alone. The government, therefore, banned 
the export of low-grade rice and raised the government procurement price in order to secure 
enough rice for the domestic market. A rice-exporting country which has a large number of 
poor farmers and consumers, such as India, has enough reason to intervene into the linkage 
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between the international and domestic markets under such circumstances. Indeed, the 
intervention policy of the Indian government was effective at keeping the domestic price rise 
modest and at the same time maintaining prices attractive enough for farmers. The rice 
procurement and price control schemes, however, would become more effective in helping 
poor farmers if the geographic coverage of government procurement is widened. Also, it may 
be more fiscally efficient if the government directly subsidizes the food consumption of poor 
consumers instead of intervening in the retail rice market.  
 
Vietnam: A Single Scheme for Food Security 
Compared with India, which applied multiple measures to control the domestic rice prices, the 
government of Vietnam has a single method, total export volume control, for its rice security. 
This measure was not new to the food crisis in 2008, but has been routinely implemented 
every year, even before the crisis. Vietnam prepares a simple approach because the price 
intervention is necessary only for urban consumers. Since the production cost of Vietnamese 
rice is much cheaper than the other two major rice-exporting countries (Table 5-1), the FOB 
price is attractive enough for rice farmers in this country. Leaving exporters to compete in 
finding foreign buyers and domestic sellers of rice, the international market automatically 
brings economic benefit to farmers. As a result, a price-support scheme for farmers is 
unnecessary in this county. At the same time, the population under the poverty line is smaller 
than in India, and the retail rice price is usually reasonable for many consumers. Any sort of 
discount rice supply scheme is not necessary, either. Rather, to secure enough rice for 
domestic use is what this country needs indeed. The total control of export volume has 
therefore been a reasonable scheme for Vietnam. 
 
 
 
Table 5-1 Production cost of paddy of the three countries
Country (State)
Vietnam(1) 2005 97
India(2)　（Punjab) 2004/05 100
India(2) (Andhra Pradesh) 2004/05 120
Thailand(3) 2005 139
Note: (1) The cost of Summer-August paddy.
 (2) There is no specification of crop season.
 (3) The cost of major rice (rainy season crop).
Year
Cost
 (US dollar/ton)
Source : General Statistics Office of Vietnam, Results of the 2006 Rural, Agricultural and
Fishery Census.  Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House, 2006. The Fertiliser Association of
India, Fertiliser Statistics 2003-04 . (retrieved July 1, 2009 at
www.indiastat.com/default.aspx). The database of Office of Agricultural Economies,
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Thailand.
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However, the situation during the end of 2007 and early 2008 was far out of the expectation 
of this scheme. The international price went up so rapidly that the consumers felt insecure 
about the food supply. Partly because of the panic purchase by consumers, the early 
implementation of the total export volume control scheme, therefore, could not prevent the 
domestic price from rising further. Actually, in situations where prices shoot up as they did in 
early 2008, the export suspension tends to be implemented too early, and as a result hinders 
rice supply from the countryside, which may worsen the situation. In this sense, Vietnam 
needs to employ additional schemes to stabilize the domestic rice market, such as a 
stockpiling scheme. 
 
Thailand: A Pro-farmer Response in the Middle of Price Surge 
Contrasting to the other two countries, Thailand did not control its rice export and left the 
domestic price to go up as the market dictated. This was fundamentally because this country 
has a large surplus, a half of total production, even after providing rice to its domestic market. 
Even when overseas demand was strong, as in early 2008, the rice which would be harvested 
soon plus the stock of the government was large enough to secure domestic needs. The 
economic status of most urban consumers has been improved considerably as a result of four 
decades’ economic development, which kept them from becoming too upset even as the retail 
price doubled within a half year. In a comparative sense, those left behind by economic 
development were the farmers. The policy of the government therefore changed from 
pro-consumer to pro-farmer in the 1980s. Several price-support schemes were introduced, and 
one of the schemes, the rice pledging program, has been seriously implemented since the 
1990s. The volume of the governmentally purchased rice jumped in the first decade of the 21st 
Century when Thai politicians recognized that the rural population represented a strong 
constituency and the agricultural policy for farmers factored greatly in winning the rural votes. 
The scheme made farmers feel safe in investing in their rice cultivation, resulting in the 
production increase. The scheme also increased the government stock, which in turn 
guaranteed food security and provided rice to exporters at a price competitive in the 
international market. 
In summary, the Thai government had no choice but to implement agricultural policies for 
farmers left behind by economic development. The pro-farmer policies have contributed to 
stimulating rice production and rice export to the present day. Thailand could maintain a “free 
trade” position throughout the 2008 food crisis partly because it had stimulated farmers to 
produce more by means of a subsidy. The price-support scheme for farmers, however, may 
become more and more difficult to sustain if Thailand cannot reduce the production cost or 
the international market becomes more competitive.  
Our case studies revealed that three major rice-exporting countries, India, Vietnam, and 
Thailand, reacted to the international price surge quite differently. They behaved differently 
because the domestic needs differ according to each country’s stage of economic development. 
The competitiveness of the cost of rice production in the world market also factors into the 
way governments intervene. India needs to intervene in the market both for poor farmers and 
poor consumers, so it combined multiple schemes to reach plural targets. Vietnam applies a 
simple policy of total export volume control since it prioritizes a single policy target, securing 
rice for domestic consumption. It has no intervention scheme for farmers since the production 
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cost of rice is low compared with the international price. Thailand is now in the stage of 
development in which there is no need to protect urban consumers, but rather farmers. The 
price-support scheme for farmers is necessary since the rice production cost is not low enough 
in view of the international price level to allow farmers to earn satisfactory income. To sum 
up, these three countries responded to 2008’s price surge rationally in terms of their economic 
and political needs and their given conditions.  
 
 
2. Rational Actors, a Thin Market, and Deliberate Interventions 
 
Even though these three countries responded to the crisis rationally and, to some extent, could 
reach their targets, it is also true that their responses, especially those restricting export, have 
brought negative impacts to poor rice-importing countries in the 2008 food crisis. This 
happened when the volume of rice was never in short supply. This was because the 
international rice market is generally “thin” compared with the total production or 
consumption. Rice is mostly produced and consumed as a staple in developing countries, 
especially in Asia. These countries, having Thailand as an exception, produce rice basically 
for their domestic consumption and channel only a small surplus to the overseas market. After 
the Middle East and Africa, whose supply capacity is far below their domestic needs, 
increased their rice consumption, the international rice market became a little bit “thicker.” 
Citing such a recent trend, some analysts asserted that free trade would ensure rice security 
(Dawe 2002; Calpe 2005), but the 2008 crisis proved this interpretation too optimistic. It may 
be unrealistic to expect that the rice market will be as thick as the markets for other grains, at 
least in the near future.  
Therefore, a new mechanism for stabilizing the international rice price should be built 
conditional on the following two constraints. Firstly, every exporting country will regulate its 
rice export for its own sake. Especially among low-income rice-producing countries, even  
export restriction may be a possible choice for securing the domestic rice supply. Secondly, 
the international rice market will continue to be thin. What we observed in 2008 was that the 
price shock hindered supply and made the situation worse. We need to make exporting 
countries feel safe to keep the door open.  
If it was true that a panic purchase by major importers such as the Philippines was one of 
the causes of the crisis, a market intervention in the opposite direction may alleviate such a 
crisis. Indeed, Timmer (2008) indicates that an announcement by the Japanese government 
that it would sell 300,000 tons of rice to the Philippines brought the international price down. 
This means that just a prediction of an additional supply of 300,000 tons of rice could affect 
the price in this thin market. Then it is worth considering an internationally coordinated 
intervention in the midst of a price surge, as the international community often does to 
prevent monetary crisis.  
In addition to setting up an international coordination system, governments over the longer 
term also need to focus on strengthening the capacity of supply in exporting countries. In the 
case of countries which can produce rice at a cost low enough in relation to the international 
price, it will be an immediate solution for stimulating production to open the channel of 
domestic rice trade to the international market. This will pull up the farm-gate price and the 
economic welfare of farmers. At the same time, this will bring new exporters into the 
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international rice trade and diversify the source of supply. Vietnam and India employed this 
method successfully and have become major rice exporters. Myanmar, the largest rice 
exporter before World War II, is now following the same track as Vietnam. In the case of 
countries in which the production cost of rice is not competitive in the international market, 
any linking between domestic and overseas markets is not enough to stimulate production. 
International organizations stress the importance of infrastructure and technology 
development to enhance small farmer production (HLTF 2009; FAO 2008; Fukuda 2008). 
However, as we see in the case of Thailand, the price subsidy has a direct impact on changing 
the behaviors of farmers and results in the increase of production volume. Income support 
schemes for poor farmers can be viewed as food security schemes not only for domestic but 
also for international consumers.   
Before the food crisis occurred, the free trade of rice was said to enhance food security. 
When the food crisis occurred in early 2008, some developing countries which banned export 
were fingered by development agencies and academics as the cause of crisis. This report, 
however, has found that they had reasons to do so for their domestic political and economic 
needs. Rather than condemning their behaviors, we suggest that building a system which 
makes rice exporters feel safe to open their export channel is a realistic solution for stabilizing 
the international rice market. 
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